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1 Introduction  
In 2001, Worrall and Scerri critically reviewed claims held by philosophers and 
historians of science (Maher 1988, Lipton 1991, Brush 1996)  that the acceptance of 
Dimitri Medeleev’s periodic table within the scientific community was strongly 
influenced by the prediction of novel elements made by Mendeleev based on “gaps” 
within the table1. The intuition behind these claims has to do with the justification of 
theories. If the evidence e temporally precedes the hypothesis h, which explains e, 
then h can be constructed in such a fashion that it will always account for e; h would 
be ad hoc. If on the other hand, h precedes e then h, so the story goes, takes a high risk 
of being refuted in case e is not observed but instead e’ is. Mayo (1991, 1996) has 
developed this intuition – probably first explicated by Popper (1965) – into an account 
of severity of test. But as it turned out it seems to be ridiculously hard to find any 
historical evidence that would support the thesis that a high degree of severity of test 
would make h more acceptable to the scientific community. This has been shown in 
numerous studies by the historian Stephen Brush (1989, 1990, 1993a, 1993b) inspired 
by Worrall (1989)2 who buried the myth surrounding the major impact of the novel 
prediction by Fresnel’s theory about the Poisson spot. Yet, Brush (1996) thought to 
have found the exception to this “rule” in Mendeleev’s periodic table3. Partly based 
on Brush’s research on Mendeleev’s periodic table, Scerri and Worral pointed out that 
the conclusions Brush drew from the historical material are unwarranted. Despite 
wrong-headed criticisms by Barnes (2005) and enduring resistance by Brush (2007), I 
think Scerri and Worrall have shown almost beyond doubt that novel predictions – 
contrary to all intuitions – did not extraordinarily contribute to the acceptance of the 
table. However, Scerri and Worrall claimed that their study also gave evidence to the 
“heuristic account” devised by Zahar (1973) and defended by Worrall (1989). The 
heuristic account replaces temporal novelty by use-novelty: A fact e, explained by h, 
is to be considered novel if e has not been used in the construction of h or in the 
wordings by Mayo (1991): (i) T entails e, but (ii) e is not used in the construction of T. 
Mayo has called this the use-novelty rule (UN)4. However, since its invention, the 
heuristic account has faced the charge from psychologism: one actually needs to get 
into the head of someone in order to establish whether a particular piece of evidence 
was used in the construction of h or not. Worrall (1989), however, has always denied 
                                                          
1 See also Shapere 1977, McIntyre 2002 and Niaz et al. 2004; see the latter for a review of the available 
literature on this topic. 
2 See Brush (2007, 258) acknowledges that.  
3 Brush (2007) has re-confirmed this view. 
4 Most recently, the criterion of use-novelty has been used by Psillos (1999) and others in defending 
scientific realism against the challenge of the Pessimistic Meta Induction. For a criticism of Psillos’s 
use of the novelty criterion from another perspective see e.g. Doppelt (2004).  
this charge quite vehemently and has claimed to the contrary that the historical 
material is sufficient to tell us whether the UN rule was violated or not. However, 
consideration of publicly available material can obviously not be sufficient because 
we cannot presume that all the relevant construction decisions will be stated in it 
explicitly. We would therefore have to also consult private correspondences and 
unpublished work in order to establish whether UN is violated or not, i.e. whether a 
particular hypothesis is ad hoc or not. There is then always the chance that material 
will pop up which is capable of refuting the conclusions reached on UN violation. 
This is exactly what happened to Zahar’s (1978) claim that Mercury’s perihelion did 
not play any role in the construction of Einstein’s theory of relativity. Earman and 
Glymour (1978) examined Einstein’s unpublished correspondence with Arnold 
Sommerfeld which “strongly suggests that Einstein did in fact use the known 
behaviour of Mercury’s perihelion in choosing his field equations for general 
relativity” (Brush 1994, 134), flatly contradicting Zahar’s (1978) earlier claim. 
Findings like Earman and Glymour’s cast severe doubt on Worrall and Zahar’s 
programme. How can we ever be sure whether a particular fact was used in the 
construction of a theory? But even if we did have all the relevant material at our 
disposal, the whole rather esoteric endeavour of figuring out which facts were used in 
theory construction is doomed to fail because, as Gardner (1982) points out, normally 
the unpublished material is not available to the scientific community in the appraisal 
of theories, which, after all, is at issue. Furthermore, it might well happen that the 
originator of the theory in question did use a particular fact in the construction of his 
theory but just fell short of mentioning this (see also Gardner 1982, 6). And it is not 
immediately clear that we can always make out from the author’s work whether that 
was the case or not without having to rely on the author’s personal reports given about 
the construction process.  
2 The heuristic account in its normative guise 
In order to give the heuristic account the appearance of a logical account, Worrall 
(2002) has attempted the following re-formulation:  
 
If, for example, e is used to fix the value of an initially free parameter λ and thus turn more general 
theory T(λ) into more specific theory T(λ0) then, since e deductively entails T(λ0) given T(λ), there is of 
course a clear sense in which e supports—indeed maximally supports—T(λ0). Evidence e establishes 
T(λ0), given that the more general theory T(λ) has already been accepted. But e gives no extra reason to 
accept the more general T(λ) itself. (Worrall 2005, 817) 
 
That is, although e supports the specific theory T’ (maximally), which had been 
derived from T by fixing a particular parameter with some particular piece of 
evidence e, it does not support the general theory T (let me call this rule [gen-
spec]negative). In other words, [gen-spec]negative is the attempt to discount ad hoc 
manoeuvres. Rather oddly, Worrall has repeatedly illustrated this rule by an example 
where the specific theory in question is not the result of ad hoc manoeuvres (Worrall 
2002, 2005; Scerri and Worrall 2001). The general wave theory of light by Fresnel 
does not specify the wavelength of any particular kind of monochromatic light. In 
order to work out a particular wavelength given a particular light source (e.g. sodium 
arc) the scientist would use the general theory, which characterizes the observable 
fringe separation as a one-to-one function of the wavelength (i.e. X/(X2+D2)1/2 = λ/d, 
where d is the distance between the two slits and D the distance from the two-slit 
screen to the observation screen), measure the fringe separation (e’) and thereby 
obtain the wavelength. Worrall argues that by fixing the initially free parameter in T 
to a particular value by using the experimental evidence of the particular fringe 
separation the scientist has produced a specific wave theory for sodium light T’. Now, 
Worrall argues that experimental evidence e’ fully or maximally supports theory T’ 
however, e’ does not support T! The prior acceptance of the general wave theory T is 
a necessary precondition for e’ to support T’, which is quite obvious because T’ after 
all is just a specific version of T. This “mechanism” Worrall sees at work in so-called 
creation-“science”. The fossil record is explained by the creationists by conjecturing 
that what might look like the remains of once living beings, in fact, are just due to 
God’s playfulness and are in fact just bone-like structures painted in tar pits, desert 
sands and rocks by God. Surely, no-one in their right minds should be compelled to 
prefer the ad hoc, highly artificial Gosse-explanation over Darwin’s theory, which 
explains the fossil record naturally and without having to resort to those fanciful 
manoeuvres. However, the point Worrall wants to make here really is that one has to 
already accept creationism before one can give any credence to the Gosse-version of it. 
Once one has accepted creationism, fossils do lend support to the Gossean version of 
creationism but not to creationism itself. What distinguishes this case of creationism 
and its Gossean version from the general and specific wave theory of light discussed 
above and which makes the former a case of UN-violation (i.e. ad hoc) and the latter 
legit, according to Worrall, is captured by the following two exceptions to his [gen-
spec]negative, which allow that the evidence, which supports the specific theory T’ does 
indeed also support the more general theory T, from which T’ was derived (let me 
call these exceptions [gen-spec]positive): 
(i) “cases where general theory T plus ‘natural’ auxiliaries entail e” and 
(ii) cases, where T’ makes “independently testable (observationally verified) 
predictions”, which are different from the evidence, which was used in 
constructing T’ out of T. 
Whereas the general wave theory of light entails straightedge diffraction, creationism 
does not make any successful predictions about the fossil record (condition i) 5. 
Whereas the specific version of the wave theory of light implies other predictions like 
fringe separations in different experiments, the Gossean version of creationism does 
not gain any independent support (condition ii)6.  
3 A problematic case - the periodic table 
Most recently, Worrall and Scerri (2001) used and claimed the validity of the heuristic 
account in their impressive case study of Mendeleev’s periodic table. Scerri and 
Worrall made clear that Mendeleev’s successful prediction of new elements, 
regardless of our strong intuitions against it (see Introduction) at the time was not at 
all seen as an extraordinary success of the theory, which would have to be located 
above the accommodation of already known elements in terms of theory appraisal. 
There is one part of their paper, which Worrall (2005, 825) calls the “truly central part 
of our analysis” and which he quotes in his reply to Barnes’ (2005) criticism7. In this 
                                                          
5 One might therefore say that the general theory of light is supported although that does not imply that 
the general theory is necessarily independently supported. However, Worrall (2002, 204) seems to 
presume exactly that without further justification.  
6 Although Worrall does not say this explicitly, presumably both condition (i) and (ii) have to be 
satisfied jointly in order for evidence e to support both T and T’. 
7 Barnes (2005) erroneously interpreted Scerri and Worrall (2001) as defending predictivism. Worrall 
(2005) and Scerri (2005) set this straight.  
part, Scerri and Worrall discuss the discovery of the element argon, which the 
periodic table in its present form could not accommodate. In order to fit argon into the 
table the periodic table was adjusted accordingly. This move seems to violate the UN 
rule of the heuristic account (i.e. an instance of [gen-spec]positive) but Scerri and 
Worrall have adverted this episode as a victory of the heuristic account.  
Argon, the first element from the group of noble gases to be discovered 
constituted an anomaly to Mendeleev’s periodic table. According to Worrall and 
Scerri argon “had to fit in the table somehow, and an atomic weight of 40 meant it did 
not fit” (444) 8. After several attempts of somehow resolving the anomaly (among 
them the supposition that the discovered argon was not mono- but rather diatomic, 
resulting in half the atomic weight), Ramsey, one of the discoverers of argon, 
proposed to create a new group of noble gases, where argon and the recently 
discovered helium could be fitted in. The manoeuvre of inventing a new group within 
the table in order to accommodate an observation clearly looks ad hoc and seems to 
satisfy Worrall and Scerri’s ad hoc criterion of [gen-spec]negative (i.e. 
accommodation2)9: 
 
At first sight, the accommodation of argon and helium by inventing a new group looks exactly like the 
sort of ad hoc accommodation2 that we insisted ought to carry less evidential weight. Surely inventing a 
new group for these elements is exactly a case of ‘writing already known phenomena into’ a pre-
accepted theory without any independent testability? (Scerri and Worrall 2001, 445)  
 
Yet, Scerri and Worrall go on to call this judgement “deceptive”, the reason 
apparently being that this particular ad hoc accommodation led to accommodations1: 
 
The atomic weights of the four [sic!]10 newly discovered noble gases have to be such that each one 
would fit into a particular space in each successive period of the table. That is, each of these atomic 
weights had to be intermediate between two other elements in each period. In addition, this insertion of 
the four [sic!] new elements had to result in all of them lying vertically below one another in the newly 
created group. These are stringent (and ultimately empirically based) constraints: it is perfectly 
conceivable that there was no way of placing the noble gases into the table that simultaneously satisfied 
all those constraints. In effect, creating a new group for the noble gases leads to a new series of 
predictions (in the atemporal sense) about already known analogies between elements. (ibid., 446; my 
emphasis) 
 
                                                          
8 In a paper by Carmen J. Giunta entirely dedicated to the discovery of argon, one can read that “[a]n 
atomic weight of just under 40 would have squeezed argon between potassium and calcium, between 
the alkali metals and alkaline earths, with which it had no [chemical] properties in common” (2001, 
113). Rayleigh, the collaborator of Ramsay, said somewhat desperately: “The facts were too much for 
us; and all that we can do now is to apologize for ourselves and for the gas” (cited by Giunta, ibid.). 
9 Let us note that Scerri and Worrall (2001) use a different terminology from the one discussed above: 
“[C]all cases in which the fact happened to be already known before a theory entailed it, but in which 
no feature of the theory was ‘read off’ the fact, a case of accommodation1. And all cases in which, on 
the contrary, the fact was both known and used in the construction of the theory that entails it, cases of 
accommodation2.” (Scerri and Worrall 2001, 424; original emphasis). That is, what we have called 
[gen-spec]positive above corresponds to accommodation1 and [gen-spec]negative to accommodation2. I shall 
use both notions interchangeably below.  
10 It is not quite so clear to which “four” elements Scerri and Worrall are here actually referring to. 
Prior to the quoted passage, only argon and helium are mentioned as being newly discovered. After this 
passage Scerri and Worrall mention neon as the “third” noble gas (2001, 446). I therefore take it that 
Scerri and Worrall, in the quoted passage, are referring to argon and helium only. It should be 
furthermore noted that there were not only four but rather five noble gases all in all (the ones just 
mentioned plus krypton and xenon) discovered in the immediate aftermath of Ramsey’s introduction of 
the new group of noble gases. 
Notice that Scerri and Worrall argument really consists of two parts instead of just 
one. First, they say that the table imposed constraints, which the newly discovered 
noble gases had to satisfy. These constraints (basically, ascending atomic weight from 
left to right and from the top to the bottom) are largely the result of the ordering 
criterion of the table invented and deployed first by Mendeleev. These constraints are 
inherent to the table, i.e. they don’t exist outside of the table in the world. Secondly, 
Scerri and Worrall assert that the introduction of the new group was justified by the 
“already known analogies between elements”. Scerri and Worrall are not very clear 
about what exactly they mean by these analogies but I take it that they mean things 
like similarities in the reactory behaviour of those elements in experiments, their 
physical properties etc. Yet, although these analogies might indeed have helped 
Mendeleev as a sort of heuristic guide or secondary criterion, as Scerri and Worrall do 
not fail to mention11, those analogies surely were not sufficient for ordering the 
elements. They themselves quote Mendeleev saying that  
 
it is easy to fall into error in the formation of the groups because the notions of the degree of analogy 
will always be relative, and will not present any accuracy or distinctness. Thus lithium is analogous in 
some respects to potassium and in others to magnesium; or beryllium is analogous to both aluminium 
and magnesium. (Mendeleev, 1891, p. 15; my emphasis) 
 
That is, in a sense, everything is similar to everything else. Analogies are therefore 
insufficient for ordering the elements. It was Mendeleev’s genius to understand this 
and to raise the atomic weights of the elements into the status of the principle ordering 
criterion underlying his table. Since those analogies were simply too “soft” in order to 
set up the table, they likewise cannot serve as a proper test for the table. It would 
therefore be going too far to claim, as Scerri and Worrall claim, that the newly 
introduced group of the noble gases was justified by these “soft” analogies. On the 
other hand, it also has to be noticed – and Scerri and Worrall draw attention to this 
very nicely in Section 4 of their paper – that the atomic weights criterion alone could 
not have possibly done the job. First of all, although Mendeleev claimed that he 
predicted the atomic weight value of yet undiscovered elements by interpolating the 
values of adjacent elements, this was not always the case (in particular for his most 
cherished predictions). Rather, as Scerri and Worrall point out, Mendeleev seemed to 
have had (most likely implicit) “extra assumptions” and heuristics, which he must 
have used when departing from the “simple method of interpolation”, which he never 
disclosed. Even more importantly, the atomic weight criterion is of course insufficient 
for breaking the ascending order of elements into groups and therefore for 
constructing a table out of a series. Here, secondary criteria like reactory behaviour 
and physical constitution had to kick in. On rare occasions, these secondary criteria 
even overruled the atomic weight criterion. And this is exactly what happened in the 
case of argon. The atomic weight of argon is higher than the atomic weight of 
potassium, which lies in the first group of the next period from where argon was 
finally to be located. In fact, the atomic weight of argon and potassium is one instance 
of the few “atomic weight inversions”, which caused some trouble before the “true” 
ordering criterion of atomic number was proposed by Moseley in 1913. But because 
Ramsey must have regarded the analogies between argon and helium as more 
important than the “unfitting” weight of argon he disregarded the atomic weight 
criterion in this particular case, which enabled him to set up the new group of noble 
                                                          
11 See Scerri and Worrall (2001, 437pp.)  
gases12. In other words, the “stringent constraints” of the periodic table (in the form of 
the atomic weight criterion13) to which Scerri and Worrall refer in the quote above 
were in fact violated by argon. This leaves only helium as an instance of 
accommodation1, which is rather meagre evidence for the group of noble gases. One 
might want to say that the new group was justified by the later discoveries of the other 
noble gases neon, xenon and krypton, which were predicted by the new group. But 
Scerri and Worrall themselves have ruled out this option:  
 
There is, as far as we can tell, again no support in the historical record for the idea that the prediction of 
neon [the first noble gas discovered after argon and helium] played any particularly ‘crucial’ role here 
or that it counted for any more than the ‘accommodation’ of argon—if anything, the contrary. (446p.) 
4 General problems with the heuristic account and the 
condition of independent testability  
Apart from the worries about the particular example of the periodic table, which 
Scerri and Worrall (2001) quote as evidence for the heuristic account, discussed in the 
last section, there are several general difficulties with the heuristic account.  
Although Worrall has strongly emphasised that his account is to be taken as a 
normative and logical account and not as a psychological one, where the particular 
motivations to construct a theory do not have to be considered, I don’t think Worrall 
succeeds in making his case. After all, condition (ii) of [gen-spec]positive still requires 
us, besides the independent testability of T’, to know which particular evidence was 
used in constructing T’ out of T14. But even if one were to ignore this point, the 
criterion of independent testability of condition (ii) is highly problematic for the 
following reasons: First of all, condition ii of [gen-spec]positive does not seem to add 
anything to our intuitive understanding of ad hoc hypotheses. Is the very concept of 
an ad hoc hypothesis not defined customarily as something, which saves the 
phenomena, without having any other justification? (see e.g. Leplin 1982). What is it 
that the heuristic account adds here? Second, condition ii is playing directly into the 
hands of Deborah Mayo (1991) who has claimed that what really underlies Worrall’s 
heuristic account and the UN rule is a criterion of severity of test. According to Mayo, 
the UN rule just “furthers the aim of guaranteeing genuine and avoiding spurious 
tests” and that “what lies behind the intuition that novelty matters, is the deeper 
intuition that severe tests matter” (Mayo 1991, 526). Although Worrall (2002) has 
stated that he disagrees with Mayo, a counter-argument against Mayo from his part is 
still pending. In the way Worrall has presented his account most recently, it does seem 
as though the emphasis is laid upon testability and not on the construction of 
hypotheses, as it was originally. There are two more arguments, which can be made 
against condition (ii) of [gen-spec]positive. One of them is empirical, the other two of a 
theoretical nature. Laymon (1980) has pointed out that in order to apply the 
independent testability criterion, one needs to be able to distinguish between different 
experimental types a and b for the original theory T and the amended theory T’. 
                                                          
12 This explains why Mendeleev did not introduce the new group although he seemed to have suspected 
a new group (see Giunta 2001). However, Mendeleev welcomed Ramsey’s move (as evidenced by the 
quote above) but thought that the weight inversion of argon and potassium (and the other instances in 
the table) were due to measurement errors (see ibid.). 
13 As said above, the analogies between the elements were just too “soft” to function as stringent 
constraints. 
 
Laymon showed that for the case of the through the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction 
hypothesis amended version of the either theory, this cannot be guaranteed. Laymon 
concludes that  
 
[g]iven our difficulties in rendering unproblematic judgments about experimental type, we should be 
prepared to entertain the thesis that independent testability is a red herring and that other considerations 
are paramount in appraisals of ad hocness (Laymon 1982, 281). 
 
Lastly, there is a delicate time dimension to condition (ii): at what point in time can 
we say conclusively that T’ has been confirmed independently? How long do we have 
to wait for until we can decide whether T’ is an illegitimate ad hoc version of T or a 
legitimate one? To a defender of T’ the option of resorting to the independent 
testability criterion is always open. One can always claim that although at time t no 
independent evidence for T’ is available it will be at time t+n. The independent 
support criterion then itself becomes some form of ad hoc manoeuvre.  
5 Conclusion 
In this paper we have seen that, contrary to what Scerri and Worrall (2001) claim, the 
heuristic account is not apt to account for the acceptance of the group of noble gases, 
introduced by Ramsey into the periodic table. We also saw that the heuristic account, 
apart from the classical charge of psychologism, in its normative guise, amended by 
the condition of independent testability, faces severe difficulties. Are there any 
alternatives to the heuristic account for dismissing ad hoc hypotheses? Recently, I 
argued (Schindler, forthcoming) that rather than trying to dismiss ad hoc-ness, it 
might be more fruitful to choose a “positive approach” and assess theories on their 
degree of “naturalness”.  
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